BEGINNING OF THE END OF EURO

To the Americans – our friends (below)

Enhedsvaluta Euro var en fejlkonstruktion fra begyndelsen som valutaunioner tidligere en politiker-konstruktion med det formål at skjule politikernes overforbrug. En tænkt finansiel løftestang, der ikke rører ved de egentlige realøkonomiske problemer.

I 1998 blev der blandt de stiftende 12 EURO-deltagende lande truffet beslutning om de nationale valutaers omvekslingskurser i forhold til den nye europæiske enhedsmønt. Kursfastsættelserne var fastsat i god tid forud, så spekulanterne bare kunne gå i gang, og det gjorde de. Euro forudsættes herefter accepteret af både borgerne, erhvervslivet, spekulanterne og EU’s Centralbank. Man kan undre sig.

Selve Euro-konstruktionen er selvmodsigende, hvis ikke nationerne forudsættes opløst. Selv da er den meningsløs, fordi den er politikernes sædvanlige eksperiment med Europa kontinentet i blinde hver gang, nu også med pengeudstedelsen, som politikerne intet kendskab har til virkningerne af. Reglerne i Maastricht-aftalen, der danner udgangspunkt for Euro, er alt andet end stramme ufravigelige krav til pengeudstedelsen. Selv 4 af de 5 tilfældigt politikervalgte konvergenskrav måtte opgives, fordi kun Luxembourg levede op hertil (Italien, Frankrig, Spanien og Tyskland havde alt for store underskud på de offentlige finanser allerede fra 2002 samtidig med at disse fire lande også var tæt på negativ vækst i eftersommeren/efteråret 2003), og det er ikke blevet bedre, men værre, med en ligeledes politikerskabt statsgældskrise overført til folks boliger og med kollaps fra 2007. Det tragikomiske i lige netop Luxembourg-faktummet består i, at Luxembourg lever af EU-bureaukratiet og bankvæsen. Det var i 2003.

Euroområdet stod 2012 med en samlet balance hos bankerne på 34 billioner euro. Det er tre og en halv gange det samlede reelle bruttonationalprodukt (BNP). Forholdsmæssigt langt mere end i nogen anden region i verden, USA inkluderet. Rekordindehaveren i denne vildfarelse er “Storstaten” Luxembourg. I denne lokale finansielle banksektor bragte dens ”tjenere” med sig 21,7 gange værdien af et års bruttonationalprodukt. Det er en uovertruffen verdensrekord. Luxemburg lever højt og flot på sin finansielle ’værdiskabelse’, der bl.a. fløj til Cypern, så de kunne blande sig med de russiske oligarkers funny money og småværdierne indskudt af Cyperns lokale sparere, for de skal skam såkaldt sikres mod konfiskation og banklukninger.

I januar 2015 besluttede ECB at opkøbe europæiske statsobligationer (statsgæld) for 8,1 billion kroner eller 1,1 billioner Euro.

De seneste tal fra eurozonen viser vækst 0,2% i tredje kvartal 2014, og inflationen faldt tilbage til bare 0,3% i november fra 0,4 måneden før.

OECD har derfor advaret at eurozonen mod at falde tilbage i varig stagnation trods faldende oliepriser – og det er den største rædsel som findes. Med de lave oliepriser er der en chance for at holde inflationen i ave uanset pengeudstedelsen med andet end en vækstbegrundelse, mener Draghi, der er ECB-præsident.

At overtage mange flere af de nationale gældsposter derimod i form af statsobligationer mod nytrykte betalingsmidler eller nye digitaltal er ikke et trick, der betyder andet end massiv pengeudstedelse i strid med alle de nedfældede regelbestemmelser i Maastricht, og de er i hvert fald langt forbi de konventionelle indblandinger på pengemarkedet. EU og medlemsstaterne er efterhånden rene forbundne kar. Og når Syd- og Østeuropa snart måtte melde sig med statsobligationer bliver ECB til en papirmølle, og det vil betyde inflation i galop, hvilket pengeunionen netop skulle være kreeret til at forhindre. Paris har måske netop ventet af samme grund med sit offentlige budgetunderskud (se nedenfor).

Europæiske politikerskabte møntunioner har været prøvet to gange før i den nyere historie, den latinske- og den nordiske møntunion, begge 1870’erne, med kollaps henholdsvis før og efter Den første Verdenskrig. “Når mange underskud og mange gældsposter lægges sammen bliver de stadig til underskud og gældsposter”. Dette var gældende i 1914, 1920’erne og 1930’erne. Efter Den anden Verdenskrig skulle vi tro noget andet, muligvis takket være J. M. Keynes’ gode tro og/eller misbrug af hans teorier.

Euro og dens primære opgaver: At gå ud fra at den fælles obligatoriske pengeenhed skulle afspejle realøkonomien i EU og tjene denne i både syd og nord har vi åbentbart misforstået. Svarende til Spaniens skæbnesvangre forvaltning af det indvundne guld i Latinamerika i 1500-tallet ser det ud til, at euro på bedste ny-merkantilistiske vis via handel afregnet i euro med f.eks. olie fra Mellemøsten og arabien til meget af kloden skulle danne det genererende moment, der kunne give det fornødne fejlforventede løft til realøkonomien. Men da euro-konstruktionen var en fejl, flød kapitalen i stedet ud af Europa, fordi andet var mere givtigt at investere i end Europas erhvervsliv.

Under Merkantilismen, der historisk afsluttedes med Napoleonskrigene, brugtes meget enkle metoder til at skaffe sig velstand. I dag er det således blevet til at økonomisk stabilitet og udvikling måles ved et prisindeks, en gældsandel, ved en valutakurs eller ved et eller andet andet forholdstal. D.v.s. når for eksempel visse kvantitative normer er opfyldt, så er der tale om en stabil valuta (med henvisning til de fem fuldstændig arbitrære konvergenskrav oprindeligt nedfældet i Maastricht-traktaten) og dermed skulle den økonomiske stabilitet og udvikling være sikret. Men til stabilitet og udvikling hører formuedannelsens dynamik, sikring af investeringsprocessen, videns- og kompetence-erhvervelse, ny teknologi og høj produktivitet og økonomisk realvækst i en stat, for at dens ledere kan siges at tage vælgerne/borgerne alvorligt i det de har kaldt demokrati.

Sommeren 2013: Eurolandene har for EU – officielt – 8,75 billioner euro i gæld. I første kvartal steg gældsprocenten gennemsnitlig i euro-zonen til 92,2 procent af bruttonationalproduktet, efter 90,6 procent i kvartalet forud. Efter Maastricht traktaten må staterne kun have en gældsprocent på 60 procent.

Konvergenskravene giver et fingerpeg om regelfastheden. For eksempel i Maastricht-traktatens artikel 104C står der: “Rådet…fastslår efter en generel vurdering, om der foreligger et forholdsmæssigt stort underskud”. Det er noget andet end en streng regel om, at det årlige finanslovsunderskud ikke må være større end 3 pct. af BNP i markedspriser. I f.eks. 2002 og 2003 kørte Frankrig og Tyskland med større underskud, i 2004 kom Spanien “med i klubben”. I traktaten står også, at fortolkningen af disse krav er Ministerrådets sag. Og det er det allerværste. Ministre ved ikke noget om monetære forhold, jeg beklager, men det er sandheden.

‘Ikke en sjæl bekymrer sig om det, ‘der har aldrig været en eurokrise’. Det er kun spørgsmålet om, hvorfor vi overhovedet betaler skat. Hvad skal de da bruge vore penge til, når de dagligt trykker papir lydende på milliardbeløb og samtidig pumper ECB (EU’s centralbank), som heller ingen penge har’, ufattelige summer ud i omløb.

Reel statsgæld i sommeren 2012:
Total tysk statsgæld og garantier: $5,315 billioner
‘Officiel’ gældsrate i forhold til BNP: 81,8%
Aktuel tysk gældsrate i forhold til BNP: 139,8%

Sådan lå det for tre år siden, og det er kun blevet værre, så tro ikke Tyskland redder Europa eller blot ét betydningsfuldt land i Europa fra statsgælden, der er skabt af løgnagtige politikere, der kun vil genvælges, og derfor bruger mere, end de kan indkradse i skatter og afgifter. De kan samle magten så meget de vil, men lige lidt hjælper det.

Det er værre i Frankrig, sommeren 2012:
Den franske sande gæld i procent af BNP: 146%

Hemmelig rapport til Tyskland februar 2015: Der er ikke sket noget i Frankrig for at ændre på det offentlige budgetunderskud.

2013:
Antallet af arbejdsløse steg med 95.000 til 19,4 mill., melder Eurostat. Analytikere forventer antallet rammer 20 mill. senere i 2013. 24,056 mill. i december 2014.

Arbejdsløsheden var kun 4,9% i Østrig og 4,8% i Tyskland i december 2014 (mit: når de udstødte ikke medregnes, bl.a. Hartz IV-modtagere og andre). Den var næsten 13,4% i Portugal og mere end 23,7% i Spanien og Grækenland (uoplyst) i december 2014. Højere skatter og reducerede offentlige udgifter i Sydeuropa har forværret den allerede dybe tilbagegang, og fået arbejdsløshedskurven til stige stejlt.

Arbejdsløshedsprocenten blandt unge i Spanien er omkring 51,4% og mere end 42% i Italien i december 2014. Det har langsigtede meget negative konsekvenser.

Formentlig ønsker et flertal i toppen problemerne med et nyt internationalt betalings- og kreditsystem klaret ved indførelse af guldmøntfod. Men det har aldrig været løsningen på de selvskabte reale problemer, og en fortsat stigende guldpris vil vise, hvor vi i virkeligheden står med inflation, arbejdsløshed og statsgæld, men guldmøntfoden har kun mening i forhold til en ekstremt ekspanderende verdensøkonomi, som under industrialismens fødsel, og den vil gøre ondt værre nu, når den kunstigt rives ud af dens historiske sammenhæng, blot fordi nogle ikke kan se to ting passere samtidig, uden at det skal fejltolkes som en sammenhæng.

Globalisering af markederne fordrer naturligvis et globaliseret international betalingssystem. Staternes ledere skal populært udtrykt simpelthen enes om at gøre det umuligt for staternes ledere at springe over, hvor gærdet er lavest og samtidig begrænse spekulationsmulighederne, der er rene biprodukter af disse lette lederspring, ganske betydeligt.

Reelle valutakurser er vejen frem.


 

To the Americans – our friends

1972: The politicians collapsed the monetary system:

Without an international monetary system since:

The gold could not be exchanged in the originally old constant relation 35US$ an ounce fine gold, when the system had functioned for twenty to thirty years. Inflation (including expensive wars of USA) made by money issuing and credits made the prices increase generally when the bill was not properly.

Why do they print too much money then? When the system stimulates re-election seeking politicians to put their country in debt, they certainly put their country in debt. It is much easier than to take the necesarry steps. But they do not tell you they do it, even though (perhaps because) you are the only one to pay. They have no money of their own, so they always take them from the tax-payers, even though (and in reality also because) they just issue new amounts of (in the long run) worth-less paper or credits. So they do not talk about the debt, I had to learn. They often promise much more than they can fulfil and more than they can finance by the taxation, so they have to borrow, if they still seek to be re-elected. And they always do.

It must be told that not all the proposals of John Maynard Keynes were built into the final Bretton Woods System. But J. M. Keynes and his epigones supplementary also made the economic theories used by nearly every western economist in the After War Period until the midd 1970s. The way they wanted us to think was designed here. And we did, almost all of us reacted as expected to the mind control. You cannot say that even though the international monetary system did not become like the one he had wanted that his thoughts did not have an enormous impact of the mind of the coming economists and naturally a more and more wondering public.

J. M. Keynes in changing roles:

In ‘The Selected Writings’ on John Maynard Keynes, vol. 17 is written in chapter 1 page 3: (quote) “When J. M. Keynes left the Paris Peace Conference and resigned from the Treasury in June 1919, he gave up his influential role behind the scenes and emerged into the limelight as a publicist and propagandist. For the rest of his life he was occupied successive attempts to persuade the world to come round to his own way of thinking” (unquote).

In the first chapter of his ‘Revision of the Treaty’ Keynes separate between, what he calls ‘the interior’ and ‘the exterior’ opinion. ‘The exterior’ opinion was the public one told by politicians and newspapers, while ‘the interior’ was that of journalists, that of civil servants and advisers behind and above the scenes, expressed in closed circles. He wrote this last opinion in his book ‘The Economic Consequences Of The Peace’ in August and September 1919. He then shows himself very critical towards the decided (later on reduced) claims on Germany, and he is also very critical towards the resulting consequences for Europe. He gives a very flattering expression of President Woodrow Wilson and of the then British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who both were participants on the Paris Conference. Keynes thought that ‘the exterior’ opinion was ready for exposure of ‘the interior’ opinion. J. M. Keynes was famous for his book in certain public circles (those I had to join after the second half of worldwar or the World War II as you like), but now some month followed, where his own future should be decided. He left his job in Treasury July 21st 1919. But he did not leave the scene. He just moved to ‘the exterior’ picture, to the propaganda-making section serving ‘the exterior’ opinion, as he called it himself.

Does state-debt mean nothing:

J. M. Keynes was awarded with the Nobel Prize of Economics in 1935 for his “On Treatise on Money”, 1930. The essence of his thoughts became the central ideas and solutions in all the textbooks made for students on economics after the war until the beginning of 1970s. I read these textbooks, and I always wondered why debt of a nation did not matter at all. Something like, “some nations make debt in a period other nations lend in a period and vice versa”. Unfortunately it is possible to account the debt of the nations fairly good (if you knew who the creditor was you could certainly turn to him). It is also possible to account what has been lended out from creditor nations. The problem then is that only a smaller part of the total nett debt are debt to a nation. Often it is debt to a private bank instead. “And a considerable amount of the debt is interior debt, and creditors are the citizens of the country”, they would say. Since 1960 Denmark made more debt every year except for two years exactly in the 1960s, and one year in the 1980s. From the midd 1980s state-paper-debt of nearly all the European countries has been bought and sold internationally too to get foreign currency. So the so-called interior debt (often talked about as a contemperary extra taxation of the richest) truly is nearly nothing of that kind anymore.

In the late 1990s I heard on TV that Russia would not have intervened uncontrolled in the Kosovo War. The reporter said that the debt of Russia was such a heavy burden on the country (1999/2000) that this would prevent Russia from doing anything not wanted (by the creditors). I see, but can I be sure, later on they stopped the payments to IMF. “Until the debt burder becomes heavy enough the debt does not matter at all”, I must conclude then, if they were right. I am not dealing especially with the so-called false money in this article (much more on this subject in http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/gol1/gol1.htm). It is made by the banks, by the so-called responsible authorities, and a smaller part are made by coiners. And I am certainly not dealing with the private debt either.

The integration of the European nations has lead to the compulsive, unified Euro, and the European monetary system with the European Central Bank (ECB) to secure monetary policy even in accordance with the European Counsel of Ministers. Will this integration of everything help? No, certainly not.

Inflation and speculators, Good-bye:

From the beginning the old system was throught out (as mentioned) quite differently from the actual Bretton-Woods-System that was built up. The US-dollar was playing a dominating role as reserve- and loan-currency. That lead automatically and quite foreseeable to nominal (inflation-dependent) determined currency exchange-rates in the member-countries, and also to domestic inflation-misuse.

Since the collaps of the Bretton-Woods-System in the years 1971-1973 every well-educated economist must know, what is needed, is Keynes’ Fourth Essential: with the introduction of the rate of inflation incorporated in the determination of exchange-rates: Real exchange-rates are needed. Bretton Woods did not handle this problem, because nominal determined exchange-rates are being false and unreliable due to the feasts of inflation in the states of the nations (with USA in a role-model included). Inflation and debt had to come.With this also the needed dependence of the power brokers.

Real exchange-rate:
A new monetary system has long been avaiable: http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/intmo.html

Using real determined exchange-rates the problem disappears. The member-countries to be are given the choice: Either give up domestic inflation or decide for more inflation – and in consequence of this give up the real determined exchange-rates and devalue. But the exchange-rates always remain “right” and “truth-worthy”, and to get such a system made permanent, the system is not bursted, and it will not force the countries to step out. This system is a little like the free ECU (earlier in EU) introduced by Great Britain before the fatal compulsive EURO was introduced with the former German Minister Of Finance Theo Waigel (“on the scene”)Such a system could function tomorrow, if the G7 or G8-directories of the world, that are aiming to One-World-Economy, would come to an agreement, and also make enough expert knowledge available. Actually the Keynes-proposal that was not carried through in 1944 can be chosen now.

What the Euro mean and meant from the beginning:

The globalization means unlimited mobility of the markets including the financial market. This globalization will destroy the democratic welfare states, many maintain. The free mobility of the capital undermines the ability of the states to regulate. Especially the labor-market. Wage-pressure and reductions have to absorb the threatening lost of jobs. The global financial markets are not subject to any self-regulating competition-mechanism, and they create crisis after crisis (Asia, Mexico, Russia, Latin America). And the crises aggravate the social pressure with claims about reductions.

The pressure of the crises are leading to either the disintegration of the welfare states into linked defending blocs (of currency like Euro-, Dollar-, Yen- or Renminbi-zones) or to the fallen back to the old enemy images, perhaps a combination of the two sceneria.

With disintegration of the democratic founded welfare and of the national state the globalization comes to an end, because the politicians cannot bear that their populations/voters have to bear more and heavy loads without any security or being recouped (compare with Professor Birck above).

Euro-Union is a prototype of this development. Its bad hidden double-motive is 1) fear of dollars-dominance and dollar-competition and 2) fear of the new reunioned Germany with its former (imagined) D-Mark-regime. Fear is always based on a false analyse of the development. It is not the US-dollar that is threatening the market shares of Europe in the world trade, but Europe’s lost of knowledge and technology and Europe’s inertia with reforms and innovations. It is not the hardness and strenght of the D-Mark that is preventing the development and integration of Europe, but since “Maastricht” the aim has been the repeal of the D-mark. The explanation is that especially the D-Mark had driven the Euro-members out in a strong negative development against reforms and social limitations. Alone these fallacies and false assumptions do not allow realistic expectations about a hard Euro. Inflation is programmed. All the member-states are deeply indebted, and totally they make new deficits every year.

At the beginning of the Euro the national governments loose their instruments of management (the currency-rate of exchanges, the interest-rate, the amount of money and a flexible public budget) to secure the values of the money, of the labor market, and of the social and ecological standards which the same politicians have introduced. Differences of structure and competition will disappear without the suspension of the government.

The primery battlefield is the the labor market, the social- and the ecology-systems. The labor market suffers from the fact that the middle class is decreasing, and the wage- and the socialcost-competition from the workers in southern EU-poverty-zones, and the liquidation of the until now ruling trade-union-wage-rates, and minimum-standards of the social nevel. The market is sweeping them away, employees use more and more their potentials of threat that includes the tranfer of productions to favourable (wage-, social-, tax-, ecology-) EU-zones. E.g. Irland where the company-tax in some areas is 10 p.c.

Wage-rates, social standards and claims of environment in Euroland have to get harmonized downwards. Socialdemocrates, other socialists and trade-unions have the naive imagination that things could improve by the signitures on the Maastricht-Treaty. In Euro-Union the social welfare policy has resigned finally – and this is happening with full consent of the socialdemocrats, other socialists and the trade union. The Euro-Union is not a mean against the employment-crisis of the globalization. On the contrary:

Both of them strenghten the power of the capital and the helplessness of the state to do something about the unemployment are to be taken in to consideration. That would have been “improvements” towards the 19th , not towards the 21st Century.

The Euro-Union is no counterbalance to the unsocial tendencies of the globalization as incompetent analyzers of the left believe, it strengthens them further. It forces lift of work to fit to monetary commands. The European Centrale Bank has to follow a totally common policy for the 12-25 differently strutured countries without the possibility to go back to equalize currency-exchanges. To prevent the capital from leaving Euro-Union the European Central Bank has to rise the interest-rate, but this will decrease the activity and increase the unemployment further.

Such a union are meant to end the conflicts of the memberstates from where no help is to be found – if it is not extended to a transfer-union or a federal state with public equalizing of the finances between the old and the new member-countries. Something like USA or the Federal Republic of Germany .

When this projections on the Euro-union show themselves as impossible or they meet too much resistance the question rises: Are there alternative models to save the world-peace. There are. John Maynard Keynes’ proposal of the Fourth Essential. Now you perhaps better understand why one of the founders of the western After War economic system died broken down and very disappointed after having finished his official work. Perhaps he became a victim of the power brokers (including all the considerations here on earth) as many before him, and with e.g. EMU, Maastricht and the Euro many after him too.

J. E. Vig, M. Sc.(Economics)

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4 thoughts on “BEGINNING OF THE END OF EURO

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